Catholic University Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 2

1966

The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 16 Cath. U. L. Rev.
1 (1967).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The Devils of Due Process
In Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial*

ROGER J. TRAYNOR"

WE RECALL ON THIS OCCASION not only Justice Cardozo's surpassingly noble
spirit and imaginative genius, but his concern that judicial decisions evince
a reasoned consideration of their far-reaching consequences. We can pay no
better tribute to his sense of professional responsibility than to consider together the far-reaching consequences of judicial decisions in our own day
on the crucial problems of criminal procedure.
Lawyers as well as laymen often voice extreme views on the problem of
crime in the catch phrases of the day, and today's vogue is to pitch them at
courts. A giant problem is in no measure solved, however, by indiscriminate
charges that the courts have a predilection either for coddling criminals or
for depriving those suspected of crime of whatever due process is due them.
We might better concern ourselves with reinforcing the words of Mr. Justice
1
Clark that "There is no war between the Constitution and common sense."
Certainly there need be no war. It could break out at any time, however,
unless we succeed in bringing constitutional doctrines down to earth on
the homely local scenes. That may prove even more of a challenge than the
launching of such doctrines, for landings often call for more skill than takeoffs.
It is no secret that we have had some spectacular take-offs in recent years.
Our concern with pretrial criminal procedure has correspondingly grown
in the time span encompassing the McNabb-Mallory2 doctrine on limiting
pre-arraignment interrogation to foster prompt arraignment, the Mapp3 decision extending to states the rule excluding evidence obtained from uncon* Reprinted by permission of New York City Bar Association.
** Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
2McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
8Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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stitutional searches and seizures, and the recent constellation of cases that
includes the limelighted Escobedo4 case extending the right to counsel to
the pretrial stage.
Amid the vociferous and often irresponsible castigation of courts for their
zealous watch on due process, we do well to remember what a void the
United States Supreme Court's rules have filled. The fault lies with the pub.
lic, and particularly the legal profession, that constitutional rules have so
long remained the major script of criminal procedure. In a wilderness all
too little regulated by statutes the Court has been compelled to formulate
such rules out of cases that have come before it at random. Now at long last
these rules are bestirring legal groups to tackle long-needed revision of criminal procedure on a comprehensive basis. Thus the American Bar Association has embarked on a thoroughgoing survey of the whole field 5 and the
American Law Institute has recently completed a tentative draft of a Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 6 Such projects, together with the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 7 may well give an impetus to state legislation. We can
welcome such projects even while regretting their tardiness, but we know
they may take a long time to mature or even to materialize. Meanwhile, it
is urgent that we stabilize our course for the duration.
Such studies are better late than never, but there is still a penalty for long
neglect. We now confront a long interim of living with the present conglomeration of federal and state rules, a devil's brew that is brewing wildly. Moreover, we must somehow find rational ways of applying constitutional rules
of olympian tenor to varied and ever-changing local scenes, where even law
enforcement officers range from the scrupulously lawful to the soddenly lawless. The best of them are likely to grow impatient with recurring messages
that loom to them, rightly or wrongly, as outlandish. Nothing is more unnerving to those amid the flack on the front lines than to receive commands of
constitutional force phrased in unmistakably unclear language. In their view
the courts are throwing the books at them, books that strike them of a weight
either confoundedly heavy enough to leave them lightheaded or confoundedly light enough to leave them heavy-hearted. It is difficult to determine the
nature and extent of their wounds, but from the outcry there is no doubt
about their pain and suffering.
As for the United States Supreme Court, it too encounters frustrations
whenever it goes beyond its relatively simple task as monitor of the federal
administration of criminal justice. When federal criminal procedure is at
I Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
5See LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965); four other
books are in preparation.
6
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).

178 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1965).
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issue it can formulate appropriate rules of nonconstitutional reach.8 It has
no comparable flexibility, however, in dealing with cases involving state
criminal procedure; then its only recourse is to beam forth messages with
constitutional radiations.
The sympathetic who hope that those on the front lines will get well from
their bouts with the books and that the supreme word-spinners will get better, often overlook the third market for sympathy where huddle the middlemen who must establish a working pax in bello between the pacific skywriters and the bellowing front lines. It falls regularly to the state judges
and recurringly to federal judges to expound with common as well as constitutional sense the sky-writing that at times dots just enough t's to cross the
eyes, but trails off on the if's, and's and but's. The loftier the message and
the more removed from the local scene, the more difficult it is for the judges
on the ground to work out the ground rules. If they fail to transpose the message into earthy language, either because of their own ineptitude or because
the message itself defies transposition, it continues to plane the stratosphere
with ill effect to itself as well as to those who are grounded. A rugged constitution, by definition the law of the land, suffers a loss of vitality when it
must circle in thin air indefinitely.
Such circling is sometimes envisaged in terms reflecting the experimental
temper of an age in which even the scribes of advertising describe their efforts
as running something up a flagpole to see who salutes it. Presumably they
can promptly run it down again if there are no salutes. In contrast, when
the United States Supreme Court runs up a message, we are all bound to give
it our respects, so that at first thought it hardly seems of experimental character. There are times, however, when no one has any clear idea of what respects we are supposed to give. An intriguing conjecture has gained currency
that the Court has no clear idea either, but that it wisely awaits a variety
of responses from the landlocked, which it can then ponder at leisure with
a view to amplifying or contracting the import of its original message.9 It
does not specify at the outset what responses will be valid, so the conjecture
goes, because it thereby impels courts in every region to think their way out
of the ensuing problems and thus to serve as experimental stations of constitutional hypotheses. It is then free to confirm or reject, in the best interests
of the nation, local interpretations of its language.
There is some poetic justice in compelling state courts to resolve in more
"E.g., the McNabb-Mallory rule, based on the Court's supervisory power, is not binding
on the states: Stein v. United States, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55, 63-65, 73 (1951); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 738 (1948) (dictum). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
9See BIcKEL, Curbing the Union, in POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 146 (1966).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVI

than provincial terms the problem of policing the community without oppressiveness. Had all state courts taken the initiative in that regard there
would have been less need for the United States Supreme Court to become
involved in policing the police. There might have been little need at all, had
state legislatures undertaken to formulate modern standards of police procedure, or had all police departments undertaken to raise their own standards. The cases that were fought all the way to Washington brought us slowly to the realization that the Court was moved to act, for better or worse,
faute de mieux.' 0
We know how circumspectly, sometimes all too circumspectly, it has
moved in some areas. Thus it took over thirty years, from 1932 to 1963, to
develop the right to counsel at the trial and on appeal. Subsequent to
Powell v. Alabama" and Johnson v. Zerbst' 2 there came the limiting Betts v.
Brady"3 rule in 1942, on which the Court marked time with eroding exceptions14 before overruling it at last in Gideon v. Wainwright"5 and extending
the right to counsel to appeals in Douglas v. California.'6
The Court also made haste slowly, though with more reason, to extend
to the states the rule excluding evidence obtained by unconstitutional
searches and seizures.' 7 It is a rule of enough basic worth to merit our characterizing it as the bon petit diable of due process in criminal detection. The
states had abundant notice that it was on the way. In a critique of Mapp v.
Ohio, I noted that:
By 1961, roughly half of the states had adopted the exclusionary rule, with local
variations. There was no uniformity of interpretation, however, and less than
consistency in either the federal or state gloss of the rule. There emanated from
the federal cases a sensitivity to federal-state relations that goes far to explain
the willingness of the United States Supreme Court to afford the states ample
time and latitude to determine how to enforce the right it had announced in
Wolf v. Colorado in 1949. However guarded the Court was about state remedies, it left no doubt that the right was of constitutional dimension, for "Security of one's privacy against the arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." It was quickly apparent that this other10See

Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965).
"287 U.S. 45 (1932).
-304 U.S. 458 (1938).
as316 U.S. 455 (1942).
" See Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REv. 478, 481-482 (1964); ISRAEL, Gideon v.
Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, in 1963 SUPREME COURT REviEw 211, 251-61.
16372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16372 U.S. 353 (1963).
'See ALLEN, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in 1961
SUPREME COURT REvIEw 1.
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wise eloquent declaration went limp on the key word enforceable. In many
states there had not yet loomed any effective remedies to attend the right that
loomed so large. Wearing its rich constitutional cloak, it went begging for recognition. Alone of the princely rights it often went begging in vain. It became a
classic right without a remedy. In California six years elapsed between Wolf v.
Colorado and People v. Cahan and all during that time we were painfully
aware of the right begging in our midst. We remained mindful of the cogent
reasons for the admission of illegally obtained evidence and clung to the fragile
hope that the very brazenness of lawless police methods would bring on effective deterrents other than the exclusionary rule. Accordingly we were proceeding
with caution before responding to the message in Wolf v. Colorado, to the
long and short of the handwriting on the distant wall. We needed no more
than Irvine v. California to read the handwriting on our own wall. In the
interim between Irvine v. California and People v. Cahan it became all too
clear in our state that there was no recourse but to the exclusionary rule. In
the interim between Irvine v. California and Mapp v. Ohio a like reflection of nation-wide import must also have been developing in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Its decision in Irvine had intimated a hope that in
time the many states still uncommitted to the exclusionary rule would reconsider their evidentiary rules in the light of the Wolf doctrine that the fourth
amendment is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth. The indifferent response must have been disconcerting to a Court that had expressed
its reluctance to invoke federal power to upset state convictions based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The many states that failed even to re-examine their evidentiary rules merely
postponed the day of reckoning. They had clear warning in Irvine that if they
defaulted and there were no demonstrably effective deterrents to unreasonable
searches and seizures in lieu of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court might
yet decide that they had not complied with "minimal standards" of due process.
When in 1961 it so decided in Mapp v. Ohio and made the exclusionary rule
mandatory in all the states, it could hardly have taken anyone by surprise. For
all their distracting, discordantly naysaying chimes, the hours had been successively striking that the zero hour was coming.1S
Of late, however, we can no longer say that the hours have been successively striking to give states warning that the zero hour is coming. They
seem to be striking all at once, as though there were gremlins intent on their
own solos in the clockworks. Since all the courts in the land must keep
time with the highest court, the time has come to inquire whether the controlling clockworks are running faster and more furiously than need be to do

poetic justice to slow-moving states. 19 I proceed to the inquiry with all delibIsTraynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L. J. 319, 323-24 (footnotes
in original omitted).
10See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929,
930 (1965).
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erate speed from the vantage point, or rather the disadvantage point, of a
state judge.
There is no need of fresh reports to confirm that judicially speaking, all
is not quiet along the western front or any other front. Not so long ago there
was more cause than now to be optimistic about the harmonious integration
of federal rules into state criminal procedure. There was at least grumbling
acceptance in the states of constitutional rules that raised standards of procedure above the misery level of coerced confessions and knowing use of perjured testimony. Reasonable men knew, or should have known, that in a
country of steadily rising expectations, we could not forever tolerate such
gross abuses of justice. There was even grumbling acceptance of Mapp v.
Ohio in 1961,20 for when roughly half the states already had an equivalent
rule, 21 the inhabitants of sister states could hardly complain that they had
been taken by surprise.
Nevertheless Mapp v. Ohio, for all the predictability of its basic rule, was
clouded with enough obscurities to confound the most cooperative state
22
courts. It left in limbo the plain question, lately settled, of retroactivity.
It left in limbo the problem of harmless error. 23 It left in limbo the still
troublesome problem of the power of the federal courts to upset final
judgments of state courts on writs of habeas corpus.24 It left in limbo
the confusing question of when federal rules should displace state rules
25
It
in determining whether a search and seizure was unreasonable.
2GINBAU,

Law Enforcement, The Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in CRIMINAL

97, 120 (1965).
"ISee Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
2 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
See People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 385-86, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501-02, 384 P.2d 1001,
1005-06 (1963); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); 64 COLUM L. REv. 367 (1964).
2'See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2 Two years later in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963), the Court held that although the standard of reasonableness is the same under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, the "States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing
arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation
and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures .. " It also pointed out that "the demands of our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible
because of our supervisory powers over federal courts and that held inadmissible because
prohibited by the United States Constitution," and it recognized that in some cases the question of reasonableness itself may turn on compliance with statutory rules that might constitutionally vary. Thus, in applying the rule that a search incident to a lawful arrest may be
made without a warrant, it stated that "This Court, in cases under the Fourth Amendment,
has long recognized that the lawfulness of arrests for federal offenses is to be determined by
reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the Federal Constitution. Miller v. United
States, supra; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 15 n. 5 (1948). A fortiori, the lawfulness of... arrests by state officers for state offenses is
to be determined by ... (state) law." (374 U.S. at 37.)
In a recent opinion I noted that "Ker v. California has now recognized that the purpose of
the distinction between constitutional and supervisory rules is to separate fundamental civil
liberties, which the states must respect, from federal procedural rules, which the states may
JUSTICE IN OUR TIME
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made no mention of the hopeless confusion in the federal rules themselves. 2
There were other rules that joined with Mapp v. Ohio to roam at large in
the fifty states.2 7 They engendered so much irrational fear, particularly
among those who automatically mistrust anything that disturbs their routine ways, that many thoughtful observers hesitated to voice rational misgivings lest their own voices would become commingled with the emotional
hue and cry.2 8 The time finally came, however, when even such taciturn observers could no longer remain tacit in view of a mounting crisis. 2 9 We confront that crisis now in the constitutional rules that reach out to govern police interrogation.
These rules compel us to take a new look at the rules that have evolved
on confessions, for they are the other side of the coin. Under fifth amendment3 0 and similar provisions in virtually all state constitutions,3 ' one accused
of crime can remain silent and thus compel the state to assume the entire
burden of proving his guilt. In theory, this privilege against self-incrimination is a mighty defense against conviction of guilt.
In practice, however, most defendants have not availed themselves of the
privilege. At the trial they often plead guilty because they are aware there
is already a strong case against them. Sometimes they plead guilty because
they are willing to accept just punishment or because they deem it expedient

to give up their right to a trial in exchange for a reduced charge or lesser sentence.3 2 There is nothing wrong with such pleas, in effect judicial confes-

ignore. Opinions written before this distinction assumed its present crucial importance may
have to be reinterpreted in the light of 'the demands of our Federal system'." (People v.
Thayer, 63 A.C. 664, 668, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782, 408 P.2d 108, 110 (1965); see also Friendly,
supra note 19, at 938-40.) It follows that "before a state rule governing police conduct may be
struck down, it must appear that neither Congress nor a state legislature could authorize it.
If a state adopts rules of police conduct consistent with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and if its officers follow those rules, they do not act unreasonably within the
meaning of the amendment although different rules may govern federal officers." (People v.
Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 452, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (1963).)
mSee Traynor, supra note 18, at 329-33.
2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confession must be tried by someone other than jury that tries guilt); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(compulsion of testimony by one jurisdiction requires immunity from prosecution based on
compelled testimony in all jurisdictions); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (extension of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (extension
of right to evidentiary hearing for state prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceeding).
28See Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-A biders, 31 Mo. L. REv. 181 (1966).
29See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 19.
30"No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
U.S. CONsT., amend. V.
n'The exceptions are Iowa and New Jersey. In Iowa the privilege has been read into the
state constitution by the courts. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); Amana
Society v. Seltzer, 250 Iowa 380, 94 N.W.2d 337 (1959). In New Jersey the privilege has been
adopted by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17, 19 (Supp. 1960). See generally 8 WIGMOPE,
EVIDENCE, § 2252 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
82See Traynor, supra note 28.
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sions, if they have not been induced by antecedent illegal conduct of police
or prosecutors.
Likewise, there is nothing wrong with extrajudicial confessions that have
been legally obtained. Confessions are such cogent evidence of guilt that
they often serve to induce pleas of guilty or to expedite trials. 33 Hence police
and prosecutors routinely seek to elicit them by interrogation and often succeed.34 There is always a high risk of direct or indirect coercion in such a process, however, because of its secrecy.35 Such excessive violations as have come to
the attention of the United States Supreme Court have prompted it to formulate exclusionary rules directed against overreaching inquisition.
Until the Escobedo case the touchstone of admissibility under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment was the voluntariness of the
confession. The case for exclusion is clearest when police or prosecutors have
resorted to procedures that might induce a false and hence an untrustworthy
confession. Violence or threats of violence against the accused or those close
to him may induce a false confession. 36 Promises of leniency may also have
37
this effect.
Untrustworthiness, however, has rarely been the sole reason for excluding
an involuntary confession. Even the earliest cases adumbrate an enlarged
m On the role of confessions in law enforcement compare Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules
in the Law of Confessions, A Legal Perspective-A Practical Perspective, Part VI, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 22, 1965, pp. 1, 4-5 with Statements of former New York City Police Chief Michael
Murphy, N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 5, and Statements of New York County District
Attorney Frank Hogan, N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
" Tactics of interrogation to elicit confessions are set forth in many police manuals. See
INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION
AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953); O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, ch. 9 (1956); ARTHUR & CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS (1959); KIND, POLICE
INTERROGATION (1940); MULBAR, INTERROGATION (1951). For critical comments thereon see
Weisberg, Police Interrogationof Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
21, 22-26 (1961), reprinted in SOWLE, ED., POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 155-58
(1962); Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's
Criminal Interrogationand Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 5-8, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
In the police station a prisoner is surrounded by known hostile forces. He is disoriented
from the world he knows and in which he finds support. He is subject to coercing impingements, undermining even if not obvious pressures of every variety. In such an
atmosphere, questioning that is long continued-even if it is only repeated at intervals,
never protracted to the point of physical exhaustion-inevitably suggests that the
questioner has a right to, and expects, an answer. That is so, certainly, when the
prisoner has never been told that he need not answer and when, because his commitment to custody seems to be at the will of his questioners, he has every reason to believe
that he will be held and interrogated until he speaks.
8 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945).
Experts on interrogation agree that confessions elicited by promises of leniency should
be inadmissible. See INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1964);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
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test of due process transcending the simple one of untrustworthiness.3 8
Though the Court invoked untrustworthiness as a basis for exclusion, it
took care to note the "fundamental unfairness" of oppressive tactics and
their demoralizing effect on human dignity.39 The Court also took note of
the marked contrast between the orderly and open procedures of the courtroom and the often unruly and secret procedures of the police. 40 In recent
cases the Court has clearly graduated to this broadened concept of due
4
process. 1
Sometimes the police have pursued their interrogation not only without
legal authority, but in deliberate violation of specific provisions of federal
or state law. Thus there have been violations of Rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and comparable state statutes and rules of
court. 42 Under Rule 5(a) an arrested person must be brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Apparently the police have nevertheless acted on the belief that they could obtain more confessions by violating
the rule than by obeying it, a plain inference from their vehement objections to the McNabb-Mallory rule. 43 They continue their violations in the
88The earliest Supreme Court case to discuss the underlying rationale for exclusion was
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). In his opinion for the court, Mr. Justice Roberts
observed that "the aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily
made is to exclude false evidence." He went on to state that "the aim of the requirement of
due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false." Id. at 236. He apparently envisaged
two confession rules: a rule of evidence excluding untrustworthy confessions and a constitutional rule banning unfair pressures even if the resulting confession is reliable.
89See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1In the early case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), Justice Black's opinion
for the Court stated, "It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as
our courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a
defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six hours without rest or
sleep in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confession. Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing
away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open court room." Id. at 154.
In amplification he quoted the Supreme Court of Arizona: "The aid of counsel in preparation
would be farcical if the case could be foreclosed by a preliminary inquisition which would
squeeze out conviction or prejudice by means unconstitutional if used at the trial." Id. at 155
n. 10. It does not follow that behavior outside the courtroom must conform precisely to the
meticulous procedures of the courtroom. Otherwise all convictions based on coerced confessions would be reversed whenever the behavior of the police did not correspond to the
required behavior of the prosecutor in the courtroom. See KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure:From Powell to Gideon, From
Escobedo to .... in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 12-13 (1965). Nevertheless police
procedures must not do violence to rights observed in the courtroom. See Comment, The
Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 313, 320-25 (1964).
S'Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
" Consistent violations are set forth in ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
Commentary on Art. 4 at 135-36, Appendices IV-V (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
"See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1944); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights of the
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states with impunity, for only Michigan and Connecticut have adopted an
equivalent of the McNabb-Mallory rule to deter violations of their own
44
prompt-arraignment statutes or rules of court.
The McNabb-Mallory rule represents an attempt to diminish the problem
of judging whether a confession is voluntary as well as to deter official lawlessness. The Court has yet to extend the rule to the states, 45 but few would
dispute that it has more than filled the breach, not merely by ruling that prolonged detention may be inherently coercive, 46 but also by establishing a right
47
to counsel at the pre-arraignment stage.
Thus one finds in the coerced confession cases intermingling strains: a rule
of evidence on untrustworthiness expanded into a rule with constitutional
overtones; a constitutional rule, phrased in terms of due process, at first bearing close kinship to the rule on untrustworthiness but gradually quitting itself of so narrow a compass; and a federal rule designed to foster observance
of prompt arraignment. There is still another strain running through the
cases, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It has made
history, and it is still making news.
The privilege against self-incrimination was first applied to a confession
out of court in a federal prosecution in Bram v. United States4s in 1897. For
many years thereafter the United States Supreme Court consistently refrained from extending the privilege to the states under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 49 but there were portents in the cases
that there would be such an evolution. 50 It materialized in Malloy v. HoganS'
in 1964. The evolution was fostered, as Mr. Justice Brennan noted in his
opinion for the Court, by the gradual shift in the basis for the exclusion of
coerced confessions from the purported untrustworthiness of such testimony
to grounds of due process that in time became virtually indistinguishable
from the privilege against self-incrimination. 52 Once the privilege was clearSenate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1958). See also Scott, The
Mallory Decision and the Vanishing Rights of Crime Victims, Police, July-August 1960, p.
28; Waite, Police Regulations by Rules of Evidence-Results of the McNabb Case, 42 MICH.
L. REv. 909 (1944); Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court,
43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 459-60 (1948).
"People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1
(c) (Supp. 1964).
" See note 8 supra.
'5Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
' 7 See note 4 supra.
168 U.S. 532 (1897). Compare Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
50 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 51
(1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
583 n. 25 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); id. at 639 (Douglas, J., concurring); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556, 558 n. 3 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n. 9 (1944).
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
" Id. at 6-9.
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ly recognized as operative to inhibit state police interrogations, it was a
fortiori applicable to inhibit interrogations in state judicial proceedings.
By the time Malloy v. Hogan extended the fifth amendment to the states
the sixth amendment had also made news. In Gideon v. Wainwright55 the
United States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to state defendants. In Massiah v. United States5 4 it held that the right does not await
formal judicial proceedings, but arises when the defendant is indicted. It was
against this background that the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois55 announced
a right to counsel before indictment, and held inadmissible a suspect's
damaging statement elicited by police interrogation in the absence of counsel.
The case might well have been decided under existing rules. In extending
the right to counsel to the pre-arraignment stage, the Court promulgated a
rule not only of dim contours but also of hazy constitutional derivation from
57
the sixth amendment. 6 Though there had been a drift in this direction,
there was scant warning that the Court would so swiftly take command of
an area that the states might well have undertaken to develop comprehen372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34577
U.S. 201 (1964).
- 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
5 In 1958 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the contention that there was
an absolute right to counsel during police interrogation. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). There were sharp dissents by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan, who insisted that such denial of counsel
was a deprivation of due process. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. at 443-44. When the Court
considered the same question in the context of a suspect who had been indicted, Justice
Stewart added his vote to those of the Crooker and Cicenia dissenters and urged that there
was an absolute right to counsel after indictment. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326
(1959). Chief Justice Warren, however, voted with those Justices who reversed Spano's conviction on the ground that the totality of the circumstances revealed that his confession was
coerced. There were thus five Justices who, in one case or another, had supported a rule that
would exclude confessions obtained after a denial of a request for counsel once an indictment
had been returned.
The states, meanwhile, were attempting to develop workable solutions to the right to
counsel problem. The New York Court of Appeals, in accord with Justice Stewart's concurrence in Spano, held that a defendant who is interrogated by the police after indictment
has an absolute right to counsel even in the absence of a request for counsel. People v.
DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960). The New York court held that an interrogation
that did not conform to this rule deprived the accused not only of his right to the assistance
of counsel but, also, his right to be free from testimonial compulsion. People v. Waterman,
9 N.Y.2d 561,564, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1961). The rule was soon extended
to statements made after arraignment but before indictment. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d
162, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 182 N.E.2d 99 (1962). When the inevitable confrontation of the problems during pre-arraignment interrogation arrived, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the defendant's rights were violated only when he had specifically requested council or
when retained counsel was denied the opportunity to confer with the defendant. People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963). See also People v. Gunner,
15 N.Y.2d 226, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 205 N.E.2d 852 (1965).
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the DiBiasi rule (see State v. Kristich, 226 Ore. 240,
359 P.2d 1106 (1961) as did the concurring opinion in People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 165,
18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 58, 367 P.2d 680, 698 (1961).
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sively. Reasonable men could hardly foresee that the provinces would be
deemed delinquent in their due process for failing to take one great leap
from the right to counsel at trial to a right to counsel before arraignment.
There is no predicting whether such rules governing detention will prove
to be angels or fallen angels of due process, but at this juncture they bear
a pointed resemblance to devil's advocates. We can at least give them their
due by conceding them a shock value of potential benefit; they could serve
to quicken the states to modernize their criminal procedures. One can then
expect much soul-searching as to just how expansive a due we want in the
moving picture of due process. Most lawyers are familiar with the sound
track of the current serial, and I quote it here only that we may register how
sweetly reasonable are its sounds before noting how diabolically elusive are
its grounds. The rule of Escobedo v. Illinois reads:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation
of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution... and that no statement elicited by
the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.5 8
I have no quarrel with the result in the Escobedo case, given its facts. The
Court's reliance on the sixth amendment under cover of the fourteenth, however, apparently makes available to any suspect a full-blown right to counsel
at the incipient accusatory stage when police interrogation shifts from general inquiry to a probe focusing upon him. The Court was unconcerned with
the problem of selecting which moment in time to impale as the crucial moment of focus. Even more disconcerting to the front lines, it gave no heed to
spelling out any exceptions to a full-blown right to counsel. Does the right
arise in the police station, in the police wagon, or in the streets? Does it apply
to all possibilities of incrimination such as voice identifications, fingerprints,
handwriting exemplars, or blood tests?5 9 Though a judge may invoke the
privilege of not answering such questions outside of working hours, he is
bound on the job to do so.
At least one thing seems clear: the Court could hardly have intended to
limit the right to those who had requested counsel, for it would then turn
on the incantation, knowing or naive, of the magic words calling for counsel.
378 U.S. at 490-91.

See People v. Graves, 64 A.C. 216, 49 Cal. Rptr. 380, 411 P.2d 108 (1966).
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Such a reading would not be consonant with the Court's own recent decisions on the sixth amendment right. 60 In faithfulness to these decisions as
well as to the Escobedo decision, the California Supreme Court accordingly
felt bound to hold in People v. Dorado6l that the right to counsel established
in the Escobedo case did not turn on a request for counsel.
A faithful state court feels bound thus to take the supreme law of the land
at face value, however veiled the rationale and hence however vulnerable to
liquidation or revision. It cannot fly in the face of that veiled face value,
even though its superior is free to discount it at any time. Though it may
struggle to give intelligible local application to such a text as the Escobedo
opinion, the public grows understandably restive at taking a program of
sweeping reach without adequate warning or explanation from the original
promulgators. They do not ask for a promptbook, but only for clear and orderly transitions in the progressive spelling of due.
Given the now widely recognized need for more light on the whole area
of police procedures, the fixation of the Escobedo rule on the sixth amendment right to counsel may have been intended as a miracle of floodlighting.
Instead, it achieved a success in flooding the area rather than lighting it, beyond the visions of even such a demon as Till Eulenspiegel. Perhaps there
was a more limited intention, to set in rapid motion the privilege against
self-incrimination at the detention stage in sequence of the Court's recognition in Malloy v. Hogan that the privilege had long been operative at that
stage, even if not under its own name. 62 The Escobedo opinion itself suggests
such a concern with the fifth amendment. 63 When it reached instead for the
sixth amendment right to counsel, it unhappily put everything at sixes and
sevens within the fourteenth.
Even assuming the possibility of waiver of the right to counsel, the police
64
may be reluctant to determine so disputable a legal question. Accordingly,
6 A request for counsel is a "formality upon which (defendant's) right may not be made
to depend." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514 (1962) and cases there cited. See Note, 19
RUTGERS L. RaV. llt (1964).
162 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
12See note 50 supra.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964) (Footnotes omitted.) If the Court's concern was to protect Escobedo's privilege against self-incrimination, the denial of his request
to consult with his counsel might have been viewed as vitiating the privilege. Escobedo had
made clear that he wished the advice of counsel before answering questions. His privilege
not to answer was violated when the police disregarded his wishes and overwhelmed him
by secret interrogation that included false accusations.
I"There is a presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, including
the right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). An accused who waives his
right to counsel in the police station may later claim that the waiver was not voluntary. The
court will then have to determine, ordinarily from contradictory testimony, whether the
accused "intelligently and knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel ... " Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14 (1964). See Developments
in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. RE V. 935, 1006-07 (1966).
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they may hesitate to elicit evidence from a suspect that he is willing or even
eager to divulge. The adage is particularly pertinent here that he who hesitates is lost. Thus if the police fail to make prompt inquiry into a suspected
criminal conspiracy, they risk losing what might be their only opportunity
to obtain evidence of such a conspiracy. Nevertheless they may still be unwilling to question any suspected conspirator unattended by counsel, for if
they then ran counter to the Escobedo rule they would immunize the suspect
from prosecution on the basis of the evidence he divulged that afforded
grounds for prosecution.
So rudely turned are the tables that the police must now confront any suspect with diffidence, instead of the other way round. There can be real damage to an innocent suspect in consequence. It sometimes happens that an
innocent person is arrested lawfully, though in error; he can be promptly
released only if the police have some latitude to question him and in that
way learn that he should be released. To constrain reasonable questioning
may work to constrain the innocent. 5 In lieu of interrogation that could
have cleared an innocent suspect, the police are likely to resort to formal
charges to hold him in custody until such time as he is attended by counsel,
either retained by him or provided for him if he is indigent. 6
If the police fail deliberately or inadvertently to advise him of his right
to counsel, a knowing suspect could misuse due process by freely making incriminating admissions and then invoking the sixth amendment at the trial
to escape their consequences. Caught between such a devil and the deep
waves of the sixth amendment, the police might eventually retreat into an indifference to their responsibilities no less foreboding for the integrity of criminal procedure than excesses of zeal.
Their major frustration arises from the satanic two-pronged question of
the Escobedo rule. When does an investigation cease to be a "general inquiry
into an unsolved crime"? When does it begin "to focus on a particular suspect"? There is more of Lucifer than of ludiferousness in a rule that compels a police officer, even under emergency conditions, to make so finespun
a determination. In the very case where it formulated so nebulous a test,
the Supreme Court quit itself of another nebulous test, namely, the twopronged voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility of a confession. It was
quite a jump from the frazzled touchstone of involuntariness to the brimstone fire of focus.
6 See ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary on Art. 4 at 144-46
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
0 There are obvious difficulties in providing for the presence of counsel in the stationhouse whenever the police may have occasion to question a suspect. See ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAICNMENT

PROCEDURE,

Commentary on Sec. 5.07 at 191 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966);

Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois,
49 MINN. L. Rav. 47, 78 (1964). Note, 73 YALE L. J. 1000, 1046 (1964).
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Consider the questions within the question of Focus, Focus, on the spot:
What is due process? What is not? Imagine yourself a police officer confronting one or more suspects. You may also be speculating on a number of hypotheses to solve the crime. Will you be held to a strictly objective standard of
reasonableness or to a more lenient standard comparable to the best business
judgment test? 67 Given the reluctance of courts to question the judgment of

corporate directors, on the grounds of the complexities of business, will they
also be reluctant to question the judgment of police officers because of the
complexities and perplexities of crime detection?
The complexities and perplexities are endless. For example, suppose you
catch someone in the act of robbery, who becomes the accused with respect
to that crime and is also a suspect with respect to similar unsolved crimes.
Under the Escobedo rule your interrogation cannot be of a piece, because
in the first situation there is a right to counsel, though in the second there is
not. Can you organize your interrogation in compartments with a view to
uncovering information on the unsolved robberies?
Suppose, instead, you capture someone in the act of committing a crime,
and wish now to question him for the purpose of apprehending his confederates. Is your focus already so intently upon him that even such questioning
would be encompassed within the focus?
Suppose you come upon a person in illegal possession of narcotics who
may be of greater interest to the police in the investigation of the narcotics
traffic than as an accused. If you proceed to interrogate him in that broader
context, have you also focused upon him, thereby fixing the moment of his
right to counsel?
So vague a test for the right to counsel as the moment of focus is bound to
engender continual disputation on a point in time, when the concern should
be with the overall fairness of police interrogation. Neither should the right
to counsel turn on a moment arbitrarily fixed as the beginning of judicial
proceedings, such as the moment of arrest or custody.s In 1961, before Massiah v. United States69 and McLeod v. Ohio7 ° held that the right to counsel
arises no later than indictment, I rejected such a marker as formulistic. Moreover, I noted that "if the suspect is in custody before indictment, the police
could easily frustrate the rule by delaying the indictment ....-71 Even assuming that such a formula might prevail to mark the time when a right to
counsel materialized, I took the view that the right to counsel would not in1039 (Perm. ed. 1965).
61People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 164, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 57, 367 P.2d 680, 697 (1961)
(concurring opinion).
e377 U.S. 201 (1964).
6 See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §

- 381 U.S. 356 (1965).

People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 164, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 57, 367 P.2d 680, 697 (1961) (concurring opinion).
71
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variably compel the presence of counsel at a police interrogation of the accused.
The United States Supreme Court decided otherwise. The Massiah and
McLeod cases hold that once the right to counsel materializes, the accused
cannot be questioned in the absence of counsel unless he has effectively
waived his right. Presumably the right could materialize also when a warrant for the arrest of the accused has issued or when he has been brought
before a judicial officer following his arrest without a warrant. The logical
corollary, to forestall evasion of the rule, seems just around the corner. The
right to counsel should now logically materialize whenever the accused was
not, but should have been brought before a judicial officer.
It is fair speculation that some of the confusion engendered by the Escobedo opinion could have been obviated had the Court based its decision on
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination instead of on the
sixth amendment right to counsel. There was already a coherent progression
of cases based on the fifth amendment whose evolutionary rationale could
appropriately have been extended to the Escobedo case. 72 Moreover, every
state except Iowa and New Jersey already had an equivalent of the fifth
amendment in its own constitution, and even New Jersey had a comparable
73
provision in its statutes.
Once Malloy v. Hogan established that the privilege against self-incrimination operated with the force of the United States Constitution in both
state judicial proceedings and in state police interrogations, its logic could
have been extended to the Escobedo case to preclude secret inquisition resistant to proof of coercion. Since the police can easily act without authority,
a suspect could with even greater logic invoke the privilege within their arcane confines than in the openly regulated courtroom. It is casuistic to pretend that because the police have no legal authority to compel statements of
any kind,74 there is nothing to counteract and hence no need of a privilege
75
against self-incrimination during police interrogation.
The fifth amendment has long been the life of the party in judicial or legislative proceedings, but it has had no life it could call its own in the pre-trial
arraignment state. Prosecutors seemed disposed to live happily ever after
with this double standard. It eased their heavy burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at the trial if they could preassemble the evidence before
7'See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1964); Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 21, 30-31, 35-37 (1965).
7 See note 31 supra.
7, See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 138, 151-52
(1960); Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. Rav. 556, 559-65 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 248-49
(1963).
78
See KAMISAR, op. cit. supra note 40, at 12-19.
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trial, at no great risk of detection, with the suspect's unwilling or unwitting
self-incrimination. 6 Even as to gross violations of the privilege it was the exception rather than the rule when the double standard came to light in an
occasional test case. On each such occasion the wails of law enforcement
officers and the reinforcing public chorus of woe spoke volumes as to the prev77
alence of the double standard.
Did we or did we not believe in the privilege against self-incrimination?
There was never a real confrontation of the question so long as there was
a double standard of the privilege. Although we took it for granted that suspects did incriminate themselves at the pre-arraignment stage in fear or ignorance, so that in the courtroom they were already damned by their own
admissions, we guarded their privilege in court with great ceremony. There
they could keep their golden silence.
The gold standard began to appear questionable only when it threatened
to become a single standard, applicable at the pre-arraignment stage as well
as in court. One seldom heard, however, that we should give thought to
going off the gold standard by revising the fifth amendment to permit some
degree of self-incrimination in open procedures, whether at the trial or pretrial stage.78 That might have seemed too much like removing the picture
of a venerable ancestor out of its ornate frame in the parlor and reclaiming
the unfinished sketch in the basement, with a view to framing both within
harmonious modern borders the better to display their resemblance. We
have resisted making either transformation, because we have grown uncriti.
cally accustomed to the ornate frame and until recently we have been indifferent to the unfinished sketch.
Should there now be a development of the inchoate privilege against selfincrimination at the pre-arraignment stage, much would be gained and nothing lost if it were developed, not as an identical twin of the privilege in judi" Those who generations from now set out to write the history of our legal institutions
will puzzle over a framework of criminal justice, which, during a public trial before an
impartial judge with defense counsel present to give aid, will not suffer the defendant to
be asked a single question without his consent. And yet that same legal system will condone the relentless questioning in secret at all hours of the day and night of that same
defendant with only those whose duty it is to ensnare him to determine where the line
between fair and foul is to be drawn. This is a tragic indictment of contemporary society.
The preaching of one thing and the practicing of another is often one of the first warnings of social decay.
Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L. J. 1,
25-26 (1958). See Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
7 See Traynor, supra note 28.
78Such a procedure was suggested by Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A
Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 1224 (1932) and Pound, Legal Interrogation
of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. ClUM. L., C. & P.S. 1014 (1934). A similar
procedure was proposed for South Africa by a judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa.
See Hiemstra, Abolition of the Right Not to Be Questioned, 80 SOUTH AFRICAN L. J. 187
(1963).
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cial or legislative proceedings, but as a workable counterpart.
A workable counterpart must strike a common-sense balance between a
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination and the community's right to
legitimate police investigation, not only to discover who has perpetrated a
crime, but to rule out who has not. There must be a middle ground in due
process that affords fair protection to an individual against the state without
thwarting efforts of the state to pursue the investigation of crime. On such a
middle ground we could establish a correlation between trial and pre-arraignment procedures that might well operate to bring a pervasive openness
to pre-arraignment procedures in which rules could operate with reasonable
flexibility instead of as martinets. Such an environment would of itself militate against more than such gross abuses as coerced confessions. It would militate against techniques that insidiously impel a suspect to make admissions
with blunted awareness of their damaging effect.7 9 It would militate even
against techniques that impel a suspect to make admissions in awareness of
their damaging effect but in ignorance of his privilege not to incriminate
himself or in hopelessness that he would in fact exercise that privilege.
Meanwhile, we must do the best we can to insure common-sense application of the Supreme Court rules that now dominate the scene. Thus it would
be consonant with the privilege against self-incrimination to leave the police free to hear and act upon volunteered confessions, for as Mr. Justice
White has observed, an accused has no "constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making voluntary disclosures." 80 It would also seem sensible
not to constrain the police with rules that would mechanically imitate such
trial rules as the one that prohibits a prosecutor from even calling a defendant to the stand. 81 That rule, designed to protect a defendant from adverse
inferences that a jury might draw from his refusal to testify, is appropriate
to a trial whose outcome might otherwise be determined by such inferences.
No comparable rule should be necessary when there is no one but the police
to draw adverse inferences from a suspect's refusal to answer questions, for
they are powerless to render a verdict. Moreover, he could be readily protected at the trial from such inferences by a rule precluding the prosecution
"Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission
of 'mere' complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing of
the fatal shots. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825. The 'guiding hand of
counsel' was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964). It is one thing for
an accused to make a free choice to speak without first obtaining advice as to the legal
effect of his statements. It is another for the police deliberately to make it impossible for him
to obtain legal advice.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
No court has allowed the accused to be asked questions without his consent. Case authority is sparse because the rule is so widely assumed. See United States v. Housing Foundation
of America, 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949); People v. Talle, Ill Cal. App. 2d 650, 245 P.2d
663 (1952); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2268 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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from interpreting silence in the face of police accusation as an adoptive admission. Silence during police interrogation, which is still far from the protective openness and formalities of a court trial, may be attributable to a
variety of causes. The accused may not have heard or understood the accusation, or he may have felt that there was no need to reply. He may have
deemed it prudent to remain silent for fear of reprisals from others. He may
simply have been averse to replying under the circumstances of his detention. I would hence welcome a rule that would protect silence at the pretrial
82
stage from invidious interpretation at the trial.
It may be worth noting that I find no inconsistency in remaining of the
opinion that a judge or prosecutor might fairly comment upon the silence
of a defendant at the trial itself to the extent of noting that a jury could draw
unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to explain or refute evidence when he could reasonably be expected to do so. Such comment would
not be evidence and would do no more than make clear to the jury the extent of its freedom in drawing inferences. I have said as much in People v.
Modesto,8 3 but the opinion proved to be only the next to the last words in
84
my state. It is now displaced by the famous last words of Griffin v. California.
As we reflect on the problem of giving common-sense application to the
privilege against self-incrimination at the pre-arraignment stage, we turn once
more to Malloy v. Hogan, which definitively extended the privilege to state
trials. It emphasizes the right of an accused "to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." 8 5 The counter-

part of such a privilege at the pre-arraignment stage could be readily safeguarded if the prosecution were required to lay a foundation for the admission of incriminating statements or confessions by setting forth all the circumstances of the suspect's custody and the details of all interrogations to
prove that he was fully aware of his right to remain silent and that the police in no way interfered with "the unfettered exercise of his own will." It
The prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand at trial does not
constitute evidence. It "does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every
essential element of the crime and the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People
v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 449-50, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 425, 398 P.2d 753, 761 (1965). In contrast
the fact of silence during interrogation would constitute substantive evidence as an adoptive
admission, thereby becoming an element in the state's case against the accused. Moreover,
the prosecution would introduce the accusation to explain the significance of the defendant's
silence. Some police officials have read detailed and vivid descriptions of the crime to the
defendant together with an accusation that he is the guilty party. If the defendant remains
silent and the accusation is introduced as explanation, the jury would have before it a vast
amount of hearsay evidence otherwise inadmissible. Even if the jury were charged not to
consider this hearsay alone as tending to prove guilt, the possible prejudicial effect is obvious.
See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 716-17, 172 P.2d 18, 27-28 (1946); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EvmENc, § 660, at 1099 (11th ed. 1935); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 74, at 212-13.
62 Cal. 2d 436, 450-53, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 425-27, 398 P.2d 753, 761-63 (1965).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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would ordinarily be incumbent upon the police who arrested a suspect to
inform him meaningfully, as soon as possible thereafter, of his right to remain silent.8 6
The United States Supreme Court would then be the final arbiter of any
constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of proof or to procedures governing the admissibility of evidence. If it determined that disputed parol testimony, such as is common in the coerced confession cases, was so inadequate
as to endanger the privilege against self-incrimination, it could require the
police to make either tape or verbatim stenographic recordings of interrogations and to maintain routine written records of the custody of suspects showing the time and place of interrogation sessions.87 Such records would go far
to dispel doubts that the police can be relied upon to advise suspects meaningfully of their rights.
On the basis of such records a court could adjudge the validity of police
procedures in the light of what happened, instead of in the dark of what
might or might not have happened.8 8 It could intelligently determine whether there had been any real violation of the suspect's privilege in the context of
the whole record. If it appeared, for example, that he was a criminal lawyer
well aware of his constitutional rights, a failure to alert him to his privilege
would neither diminish his own awareness thereof nor interfere with "the
unfettered exercise of his own will."
Moreover, reliable records would go far to mitigate the evils of secret procedures. They would give some assurance that the normally awesome environment in which a suspect confronts officials of the state would be tempered to induce in him respect for the law rather than dread of its representmSuch a rule should not be operative in emergencies, however, as when the police must
elicit information from an accused to save life. In such a case in California, we held that
the failure of the police to warn the accused of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel did not render inadmissible statements made by the defendant after his victim had
disappeared but before her body had been discovered. "They were freely and voluntarily
made at a time when the officers were concerned primarily with the possibility of saving (the
victim's) life." The paramount interest was to save her life. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436,
446, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 422, 398 P.2d 753, 758 (1965).
Such an emergency illustrates the need for flexible rules that take account of interests
superior to those of a suspect in the light of all the circumstances. See dissenting opinion of
Jackson, J. in Brinigar v. United States, 358 U.S. 160, 183 (1949); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); People v. Gilbert, 63 A.C. 722, 738-39, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918-19,
408 P. 2d 365, 374-75 (1965); People v. Smith, 63 A.C. 838, 856, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 394-95,
409 P.2d 222, 234-35 (1966); People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 724, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 197-98,
401 P. 2d 665, 669-70 (1965). Since the officers acted lawfully, the Court had no basis for invoking an exclusionary rule designed to deter unlawful police conduct. In judging whether
police conduct has been lawful a court must ask itself the hard question, how otherwise
would it have had the police proceed?
See Enker & Elsen, supra note 66, at 85, 87; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO
cEDUJRE § 4.09 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
1 "If one theme runs through the coerced confession cases, it is that the Court does not
know what happened at the police station." Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions
on Police Interrogation,25 OHIo ST. L. J. 449, 497 (1964).
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atives. They would redound to the benefit of the police as well as the suspect
by strengthening the foundation for the admissibility in court, in the event
of trial, of whatever statements a suspect chose to make of his own will.
An advance toward uniform minimum standards of law enforcement
could be expedited by appropriate application of the rules in Mapp v. Ohio,
Malloy v. Hogan, and Gideon v. Wainwright. The Mapp rule, giving force
to the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, could operate to preclude unreasonably long detentions before arraignment 9 and still not frustrate reasonable police inquiry for the purpose
of determining whether a suspect should be formally charged or released. The
square recognition in Malloy v. Hogan of a privilege against self-incrimination at the pre-arraignment stage gives the suspect formidable protection
at that stage that could in large measure serve in lieu of the right to counsel.
The Gideon rule and its satellites could be amplified to cover a right to counsel no later than the time the suspect would have been arraigned, thereby
precluding any maneuver to delay his right to counsel by delaying his arraignment.
This report on the devils of due process in criminal detection and detention leads to a final note on their troublesome Fra Diavolo, the privilege
against self-incrimination at trial. There is no need to review here the sorry
abuses of justice that led at last to the privilege, 90 and there is not time to analyze the role of a comparable privilege in congressional investigations or other proceedings as a safeguard either against self-incrimination or against invasions of privacy. 91 It is timely to recall, however, in relation to the trial,
the observation set forth earlier in relation to the pretrial stage, that recent
constitutional rules militate against a continuing double standard of the privilege against self-incrimination.
If we illuminate at last the recesses of pre-arraignment procedures the better to protect any suspect, is he still to keep truth in the dark in the open sessions of a trial, where traditional guarantees of fairness are scrupulously enforced to protect him against accusation that in any event must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt? Will we in time abandon our preoccupation
with the privilege, as to the usual crimes not involving beliefs, for an enlarged concern with the overall fairness of criminal procedure? Will we give
greater emphasis to the shared interest of the community and of any suspect, guilty or innocent, in fair procedure, and less emphasis to the interest
of a guilty suspect in escaping conviction? Would we thereby more effectively
11See Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 569-72 (1963).
10See Sutherland, supra note 72, at 27-30.
See Meltzer, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and PracticalConsiderations,
9 BuLL. ATOMIC SCI. 176 (1953); Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and
Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC Sci. 181 (1953); Meltzer, Invoking the Fifth
Amendment-A Rejoinder, 9 BuLL. ATOMIC Sci. 185 (1953).
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counter organized crime without weakening the protection of isolated individuals? No one knows what answer will eventually be made to the question suggested earlier: Do we or do we not want a boundless privilege against
self-incrimination now that it has doubled itself? That question we leave to
92
the future.
For the present we have enough to do to keep on course with the constitutional rules of criminal procedure. There is no predicting whether they
will leave latitude in the law for constructive integration of the studies now
under way. It is not too much to hope that the Supreme Court will formulate the rules with a high sense of responsibility for their far-reaching consequences and will make transitions from one case to another that keep the
peace between the Constitution and common sense.
As we leave it to its work, we confront the original sin that is the source of
most of the troubles we are now having with the devils of due process. It is the
deadly sin of sloth, long rampant in our own midst. In the nick of time we
can still rouse ourselves to reconstruct the blighted areas of criminal procedure. The problems are fiendish, the work diabolic, but the angels should be
on our side.
12

The classic critique of the policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination is still

BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

(McNaughton Rev. 1961).

(1827); see also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
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